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The Fundamental and Natural Law ‗Repugnant Review‘ 
Origins of Judicial Review: A Synergy of early English 
Corporate Law with Notions of Fundamental and Natural 
Law 
 
Lawrence Joseph Perrone 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Constitution does not explicitly authorize judicial review. This 
lack of authorization has resulted in centuries of debates over the origins 
of judicial review. Many discussions of judicial review begin with 
Marbury v. Madison whereas others begin their analysis pre-Marbury. 
Numerous pre-Marbury scholars trace the origins to sixteenth and 
seventeenth century England. Any discussion of the ―origins‖ of judicial 
review that ignores the early English sixteenth and seventeenth-century 
practices and precedents is incomplete. 
This article has two purposes. The first purpose is to outline and 
summarize the various understandings of the origins of judicial review. 
The second purpose is to set forth the proposition that the origins of 
judicial review did not arise from the pen of John Marshall in Marbury v. 
Madison, but rather took root in two ways: one in practice and one in 
thought. ―First, the early English courts in practice routinely reviewed 
corporate by-laws for repugnancy to the laws of England.‖1 Second, 
these repugnant reviews were grounded in the thought that principles of 
natural law control human law. This article will argue that both this early 
practice and mode of thought influenced early colonial views pertaining 
to judicial review. 
If viewed parsimoniously, early English corporate practice of 
repugnancy review, plus review for consistency with natural law, plus 
early American colonial courts reviewing legislative or executive acts for 
repugnancy with notions of natural law, equals: early English court 
influence on judicial review in pre-Marbury America. 
Many scholars, perhaps in an attempt to say something new about 
judicial review, advocate for different understandings of its origins 
without acknowledging one very critical concept: that historical practices 
 
 1. Mary S. Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 504 
(2006). 
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grounded in longevity are equally influential to historical modes of 
thought. ―Specifically, judicial review scholars have failed to recognize 
the importance of English corporate practices stemming from the late 
sixteenth century which demonstrate an early acceptance of the practice 
known today as judicial review.‖2 The English courts‘ review of 
corporate practices in England, reviewing corporate by-laws and 
executive ordinances for repugnancy to the laws of England, likely gave 
the Founders groundwork for drafting the Constitution and its implicit 
inclusion of judicial review.
3
 However, those who advocate for the 
corporate origins of judicial review fail to assign due importance to the 
historical mode of thought that attached to such corporate reviews—that 
these reviews were likely premised on natural law.
4
 
The position advocated in this article stems from two different 
approaches of historical analysis placed alongside one another: (1) the 
fact that English courts reviewed corporate practices of English 
corporations for repugnancy,
5
 and (2) the relationship between England 
and its colonies during England‘s imperialistic rulings.6 These 
approaches, in light of the evidence that natural law prevailed in the 
minds of men on both sides of the Atlantic, will hopefully illuminate a 
different way of looking at the origins of judicial review. This view of 
the origin of judicial review seeks to combine and expound on two 
minority views of early constitutional law. First, that Lord Coke in the 
classic 1610 Bonham’s Case decision reviewed an act of government for 
consistency with natural law as opposed to applying a strict statutory 
interpretation. Second, that this exercise, later to be known as judicial 
review, was rooted in early English corporate practice. The practice of 
early English courts reviewing corporate practices for repugnancy with 
natural law has striking similarities to the language used in early 
American courts reviewing their own governmental actions for 
 
 2. Id. Bilder not only does not ignore this, rather, she is primarily responsible for this view. 
However, the primary difference between Bilder‘s view and my own is that I advocate for the 
primacy of fundamental and natural law as an influential factor in judicial review—that review for 
consistency with fundamental and natural law was the bulwark of the origins of judicial review, and 
its occurrence in the corporate practice arena was merely incidental. Bilder argues the opposite—that 
corporate practice review was the foundation of judicial review, not fundamental principles of 
natural law. In my view, the practice and mode of thought (natural law) attached to one another and, 
thus, cannot be intellectually or historically divorced. 
 3. Id. at 535. 
 4. Id. at 508. 
 5. Id. All views and factual assertions concerning reviewing corporate practices for 
repugnancy were obtained from Bilder‘s 2006 article. 
 6. Id. at 507 (―This article adopts a different stance by abandoning an intent-focused 
inquiry.‖). 
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consistency with natural and fundamental law—in the form of written 
constitutions.
7
 
Some disclaimers need be made before delving into the historical 
accounts. First, my thesis is limited insofar as it is a synthesis of two 
minority points of view: (1) that the English courts‘ practice of reviewing 
Acts of Parliament was in the form of corporate by-laws and ordinances 
authorized by Parliament and (2) that courts applying these repugnant 
reviews asked whether the by-law or ordinance was consistent with 
natural law. Both, in turn, influenced early American thought. By 
connecting these two modes of analysis, a bridge of inferential logic may 
paint a new picture superimposed on an already familiar landscape. 
Part I of this article provides general background information on the 
original understandings of judicial review. This section will first outline 
varying theories advocated by scholars and academics alike. However, 
the main thrust of Part I, though many dispute or ignore its relevance, is 
to emphasize the importance of my starting point: Bonham’s Case. Part 
II of this article describes the early instances when English courts 
reviewed corporate practices and by-laws for repugnancy. These 
instances were so well understood that early American constitutional 
theory assumed the existence of some sort of judicial review based on the 
fact that English courts engaged in repugnant reviews.
8
 Part III sets forth 
the intent-based inquiry of early American constitutional thought linking 
the early English courts‘ use of the word repugnant to instances of use in 
colonial America. Part IV revisits these repugnant reviews and 
demonstrates how the string of inferences, through the use of the word 
repugnancy, ultimately commands the conclusion that the Founders were 
influenced by these early repugnant reviews, both by corporate practice 
and review for consistency with natural law. This conclusion is 
strengthened by the fact that the word repugnant, whether used in 
England or colonial America, was simultaneously associated with both 
natural law and the courts‘ review of corporate practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 7. See Mathew P. Harrington, Judicial Review Before John Marshall, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 51, 68 (2003) (―After all, before a court could definitively declare that a statute violated 
fundamental law, it had to be able to point to some body of law which might be regarded as 
fundamental. In England, this was nearly impossible because there was no universally agreed-upon 
formulation of those customs or rules which might be considered fundamental to English liberties.‖). 
 8. Bilder, supra note 1, at 565 (―The courts‘ ability to void repugnant legislation was simply 
assumed because of past corporate and colonial practices that limited legislation by the laws of the 
nation.‖). 
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II.  REVIEWING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
Most discussions concerning judicial review begin and end with 
Marbury v. Madison. Did John Marshall invent judicial review, or was 
the concept originally understood pre-Marbury? 
One of the dominant views is that of Stanford Law Dean and 
preeminent constitutional scholar Larry Kramer; he argues that judicial 
review was originally (pre-Marbury) accepted as a judicial power but 
rarely exercised unless statutes clearly violated the Constitution.
9
 Dean 
of Fordham Law School, William Treanor, has written extensively on 
judicial review and disputes Kramer‘s position, contending that judicial 
review before Marbury was a common practice that was not restricted to 
cases of clear constitutional violations.
10
 The difference, he argues, is 
that courts would merely allocate differing standards of review 
dependent upon the subject matter of the litigation.
11
 
Conversely, another view is that the Framers never intended for 
congressional legislation to be reviewed by courts; thus, Marbury v. 
Madison was a sharp departure of the original understanding of courts‘ 
roles.
12
 Constitutional historian and Professor of Law at Vanderbilt 
University Suzanna Sherry, among others, has argued for an elaborate 
original understanding of judicial review where statutes were examined 
to determine whether they either violated natural law or were 
inconsistent with the written constitution.
13
 
Scholars have argued that judicial review was present ―in the 
thoughts of the patriots, the words of the Founders and the actions of the 
states.‖14 Others explain that judicial review, at least partially, resulted 
from early discontent with legislative supremacy ending in impulsive and 
excessive legislation.
15
 Kramer has argued that the Constitution never 
 
 9. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 73–4 (2001); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
 10. William M. Treanor, Judicial Review before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 457–8 
(2005). 
 11. Id. at 458. 
 12. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1962). 
 13. Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987); 
Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1988); Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, Jr., Elusive Foundation: John Marshall, James Wilson, and the Problem of Reconciling 
Popular Sovereignty and Natural Law Jurisprudence in the New Federal Republic, 72 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 113 (2003). 
 14. Anthony V. Baker, “So Extraordinary, So Unprecedented an Authority”; A Conceptual 
Reconsideration of the Singular Doctrine of Judicial Review, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 729, 734 (2001). 
 15. Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 1031, 1054–6 (1997). 
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authorized judicial review,
16
 whereas University of San Diego School of 
Law Professor Siakrishna Prakash and University of California, Berkeley 
Professor John Yoo‘s well-received article argues that both the text and 
structure of the Constitution clearly intended to authorize judicial 
review.
17
 Constitutional law and theory expert and Harvard Law School 
Professor Mark Tushnet has advocated for the complete abrogation of 
judicial review.
18
 These scholars, and the many others who have 
discussed judicial review, start their analyses in many different places. 
One of the only appropriate beginning points for a complete analysis of 
judicial review is at Bonham’s Case–specifically, the question whether 
Coke‘s infamous statement from that case influenced early American 
constitutional theory. 
In Dr. Bonham’s Case, the College of Physicians imprisoned Dr. 
Bonham for practicing medicine without a license after repeated attempts 
to prevent him from doing so.
19
 Dr. Bonham argued the college‘s 
incorporation did not authorize imprisonment. In front of Chief Justice 
Coke, Dr. Bonham‘s claim for false imprisonment was accepted, and 
Coke‘s famous statement flowed from pen into history: 
 
And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will 
controul [sic] Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be 
utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right 
and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common 
law will controul [sic] it, and adjudge such Act to be void . . . .
20
 
 
The essence of Coke‘s statement was that letters patent—the corporate 
charter given to the College of Physicians from Parliament—was in part 
void because the charter made the College both judge and jury in 
imprisoning Dr. Bonham. In doing so, Coke seems to have been 
appealing to some form of fundamental or natural law.
21
 Allowing a 
corporation to be judge and jury in the case of imprisoning its 
professionals is against principles of natural law because the phrase 
 
 16. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 234–35 (2000). 
 17. Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 
982 (2003). 
 18. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 99–102, 154 
(Princeton 1999). 
 19. Dr. Bonham‘s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (1610), available at 
http://plaza.ufl.edu/edale/Dr%20Bonham‘s%20Case.htm (English modernized in website). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Raoul Berger, Doctor Bonham’s Case: Statutory Construction of Constitutional Theory?, 
117 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 533 (1969). 
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―against reason‖ ―was the familiar reference to the immutable law of 
nature.‖22 If notions of natural law were present, Dr. Bonham‘s Case is 
an example of a court, subordinate to almighty Parliament, invalidating 
Parliamentary actions by reviewing it for consistency with principles of 
natural law. 
The prevailing and entirely reasonable argument is that Coke‘s 
statement was not intended to limit the supremacy of Parliament, but was 
rather merely an exercise in statutory interpretation.
23
 Under this view, 
Coke‘s statutory construction lent nothing to judicial review as 
understood by John Marshall or today‘s courts. The late Raoul Berger, 
professor of law at Harvard, took a position to the contrary: judicial 
review ―did not require acceptance of such later concepts as separation of 
powers and the like to declare judicially what was generally accepted: a 
‗positive‘ law that violated the law of nature was ‗no law.‘‖24 
The determination of whether Coke‘s statement influenced colonial 
American constitutional theory has centered on the debate of statutory 
construction or constitutional interpretation, that is, whether Coke‘s 
position was that fundamental and/or natural law principles constrained 
Parliament, or whether his arguments were merely a routine exercise in 
statutory interpretation. But a discussion centered solely on this debate is 
incomplete. 
A more complete view is that Coke‘s statement likely influenced 
early American thought because he intended to constrain acts of 
Parliament ―against common right and reason‖ insofar as it related to 
common early English corporate practice.
25
 The exercise of reviewing 
corporate charters and letters patent for validity was common practice in 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 525 (citing L. Wroth & H. Zobel, Editorial Note in 2 J. ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS 118 
(L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds., 1965)). Berger‘s article argues the opposite point, but uses the previous 
source as a counterargument to his position that Coke‘s statement was not mere statutory 
construction. Berger argues it was an exercise in constitutional, fundamental, or natural law review 
wherein Coke set forth the proposition that even almighty Parliament is constrained by ―common 
right and reason.‖ 
 24. Id. at 545. 
 25. Bilder, supra note 1, at 532 (citing Dr. Bonham‘s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (1610)). 
Throughout this paper, I rely heavily upon Mary Bilder‘s recent Yale Law Journal both for its views 
and well-developed research materials. Many primary and secondary sources have been pulled from 
her well-crafted article. I also borrow the organization of Bilder‘s article at times. For example, the 
first portion of her article delves into the history of repugnancy in legal discourse. So, too, does this 
paper focus on a repugnant review insofar as it relates to the corporate origins portion of this paper. 
While I borrow her views for most of the corporate practice arguments and sources, she argues 
English corporate law eventually became a ―transatlantic constitution binding American colonial law 
by a similar standard of not being repugnant to the laws of England.‖ Id. at 504. My position is that 
Bilder is correct insofar that corporate practices influenced or catalyzed this type of review, but is 
incorrect in discounting the importance fundamental principles of natural law played in influencing 
colonial courts; perhaps, more so than the corporate practice itself. 
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Coke‘s day.26 These corporate practices focused on one determination: 
whether the corporate charter was repugnant to the laws of England. 
Thus, not only did judicial review likely have its origins in a natural law 
repugnant review, but also its origins incidentally were grounded in 
corporate practice.
27
 
 
III.  A REPUGNANT REVIEW 
 
The great Lord Ellsmore once inquired, ―If the words of a statute be 
contraryant or repugnant, what is there then to be said?‖28 Coke 
invalidated laws that were ―against common right and reason, or 
repugnant‖29 to the laws of England. Likewise, whether Marshall was 
correct or not, he was clear: ―[i]t is a proposition too plain to be 
contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to 
it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.‖30 
In fact, the word repugnant is used six times in Marbury.
31
 
Are these uses of the word repugnant coincidental? It seems that the 
two most important decisions in history pertaining to the original 
understanding of judicial review both use the same terminology when a 
court reviews a legislative act.
32
 While scholars dispute the influence of 
Bonham’s Case on discussions of judicial review, no one seems to deny 
that Marbury officially set down the principle in American law. Some 
have said that Marbury invented judicial review, whereas the vast 
majority of scholars argue that Marbury merely codified a preexisting 
principle—that federal and state courts may review legislative or 
executive acts for constitutionality. Regardless of the credence one lends 
to Bonham’s Case or Marbury v. Madison, a look into repugnant reviews 
by early English courts compels the conclusion that judicial review had a 
long history beginning in England, and was primarily used when courts
 
 26. Id. at 532. 
 27. See generally id. 
 28. S.E. Thorne, Dr. Bonham’s Case, 1938 LAW Q. REV. 543, 549, reprinted in S.E. 
THORNE, ESSAYS IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 269, 275 (Hambledon Press 1985) (emphasis added). 
 29. Bonham‘s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (1610). 
 30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Noah Feldman, The Voidness of Repugnant Statutes: Another Look at the Meaning of 
Marbury, 148 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC‘Y 27, 31 (2004). Feldman notes that both words, repugnant and 
contraryant, appear in Bonham’s Case and in Marbury v. Madison. Feldman assumes that the word 
repugnant was rare in legal discourse and Bilder‘s article rebukes this assumption, demonstrating 
persuasively that English courts commonly used repugnant in corporate cases and thereafter colonial 
courts followed in using repugnant. See Bilder, supra note 1, at 513–15. 
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reviewed corporate by-laws and ordinances for repugnancy to 
fundamental principles of natural law.
33
 
To start a corporation in sixteenth-century England, none other than 
Chief Justice Coke ―summed up the medieval rules and laid down the 
modern rule.‖34 Coke, in the Case of Sutton’s Hospital, outlined four 
ways in which to lawfully incorporate. ―Lawful authority of 
incorporation‖ was only proper by royal charter, an act of Parliament, 
prescription, or by the common law.
35
 State sanction was thus required 
for incorporation. However, according to the English legal historian 
William Holdsworth, an Act of Parliament can ―of course do anything; 
so that it can give a corporation power which, without such a sanction, 
would infringe the principles of the common law . . . .‖36 This statement 
seems inconsistent with Coke‘s view that an Act of Parliament repugnant 
to common right or reason is ―utterly void.‖37 But this type of repugnant 
review seems to be a longstanding English corporate practice. 
As a matter of fact, Holdsworth even recognized that corporate by-
laws were susceptible to being questioned before the king‘s courts.38 
Courts addressed constitutional limits on corporate by-laws, ordinances, 
and authority in at least six cases preceding Bonham‘s Case.39 The cases 
in which early English courts reviewed corporate by-laws for validity 
preceding Bonham’s Case are as follows: Chamberlain of London’s Case 
(1590), Doggerell v. Pokes (1595), Babv. Clerk (1595), Wilford v. 
Masham (1595), Clark’s Case, and Davenant Hurdis (1599).40 An 
independent review of several of these cases confirms what Mary Bilder 
has already concluded: corporate by-laws were routinely reviewed for 
repugnancy.
41
 
 
 33. This conclusion could accurately be characterized as a synthesis between Mary Bilder‘s 
thesis (see supra note 1) and Raoul Berger‘s position (see supra note 21). 
 34. William Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 31 Yale 
L.J. 382, 382, n.4 (1922). 
 35. Case of Sutton’s Hospital, (1613 K.B) to Co. Reb. 1a, 29b. 
 36. Holdsworth, supra note 34, at 384. 
 37. Bonham‘s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638. 
 38. 9 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 45–71 (1926). 
 39. Bilder, supra note 1, at 526. Bilder conducted an in-depth review of English corporate 
law and its relation to judicial review. 
 40. Id. Bilder is responsible for finding these cases. However, particular cases were pulled for 
an independent review. 
 41. After reviewing primary and secondary sources from both English and American 
Scholars, it is still not entirely clear whether English courts conducting reviews of corporate 
ordinances were applying constitutional law, mere statutory construction, or applying fundamental 
principles of natural law. However, it is most likely that these early English courts were reviewing 
the corporate by-laws for consistency with natural law. It was the prevailing view in seventeenth-
century England that natural law principles were transcendent and superior ―to the positive law 
enacted by human institutions.‖ KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 9, at 11 (citing 
CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 21 (1914)). 
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For example, in the Chamberlain of London’s Case, the King‘s 
Court upheld a corporate ordinance, but Coke exclaimed that 
―ordinances, constitutions, or by-laws‖ that ―are contrary or repugnant to 
the laws or statutes of the realm are void and of no effect.‖42 If by this 
early statement Coke meant notions of natural law could void 
Parliament, then this is evidence that a court could invalidate an act of 
Parliament. 
Moreover, in Clark’s Case (1596), Clark was imprisoned under an 
incorporated town‘s charter, and this imprisonment was found contrary 
to the Magna Carta.
43
 In Davenant v. Hurdis (1599), the court stated that 
a corporation could only make ordinances that were ―not contrary to the 
laws and constitutions of the king, nor in prejudice to the majority of 
citizens of London.‖44 These instances of review by a court suggest that 
early English courts had some power of judicial review by reviewing an 
Act of Parliament for repugnancy. This exercise of power by a court was 
not readily known as judicial review because judicial review ―initially 
had no name because it was not an intellectual invention.‖45 
These cases and corporate practices, alongside the well-founded 
conclusion that early English courts could determine whether legislative 
and executive acts were repugnant to natural law, set the stage for early 
colonial influence. Even Holdsworth acknowledged that ―no human law 
which was contrary to these universal laws [of ‗nature or reason‘] was 
valid.‖46 
American legal and constitutional history Professor Mary Bilder‘s 
contribution to the preceding views and historical accounts is undeniably 
invaluable. But before delving into early American case law and debate, 
clarity again demands illumination of the difference between her view 
and this article. Bilder claims that these corporate practice reviews, 
which also extensively occurred in the colonies, created a ―transatlantic 
constitution binding American colonial law.‖47 Bilder rebuffs the theory 
that the English practice of applying a repugnancy test based on natural 
law played a significant role in the origin of judicial review.
48
 Her 
premise is sound, but the more complete view is that the courts‘ review 
for repugnancy to the laws of England and England‘s unwritten 
 
 42. 77 Eng. Rep. 151 (1590). 
 43. 77 Eng. Rep. 152 (1596). 
 44. 72 Eng. Rep. 769 (1599); Moore Rep. 576–91, 672. 
 45. Bilder, supra note 1, at 509. 
 46. 4 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 280 (3d ed. 1945). 
 47. Bilder, supra note 1, at 504. 
 48. Id. at 555 (―Seventeenth-century statements about fundamental law did not create the 
practice [referring to judicial review].‖ This entirely disregards the substance of the statement in 
Bonham’s Case). 
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constitution cannot be divorced from court review based on natural law. 
Hence, judicial review‘s origins stem both from corporate- and natural-
law reviews. 
The primary reason why courts could review these types of acts from 
a superior body without controversy is that courts were at times applying 
natural law—a law higher than human law.49 Therefore, the dispositive 
difference between the English system of judicial review and the 
American model is that both the State and Federal Constitutions codified 
many of the fundamental and natural law principles.
50
 Early colonial 
thought suggests that judicial review stemmed from some sort of 
repugnant review.
51
 
 
IV.  EARLY AMERICAN THOUGHT 
 
This section will analyze colonial case law and historical debates to 
suggest that some form of judicial review was accepted pre-Marbury and 
that this form likely stemmed from the fact that Colonial courts, as part 
of their analyses, often determined if legislative and executive acts were 
repugnant to principles of fundamental and natural law codified in 
written constitutions. The concrete nature of written constitutions 
probably catalyzed a more robust form of judicial review than that found 
in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England. 
First, this section will discuss two unquestionable examples of pre-
Marbury cases that establish that judicial review was present before John 
Marshall penned Marbury. Second, this section will discuss how both of 
these cases use the word repugnancy in describing judicial review. Third, 
after establishing that early colonial courts used some form of judicial 
review, choosing to use the word repugnancy in doing so, subsections 
(C) and (D) will provide other examples of the use of the word 
repugnant in early colonial corporate practices and during the 
Constitutional Convention debates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49. Berger, supra note 21. 
 50. Id. Another relevant difference is the general distrust of government evident in the 
structural makeup of our political system. I would presume this is common among countries that 
ratify constitutions post-revolution, gaining their independence from another imperial nation. This 
could be another explanation for the robustness of our model of judicial review as compared to that 
of England‘s. However, discussion on this point is outside the scope of this paper. 
 51. Bilder, supra note 1. 
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A.  The First Case: The Case of the Prisoners 
 
In the Case of the Prisoners,
52
 John Caton, James Lamb, and Joshua 
Hopkins were convicted of treason for aiding the British during the 
revolutionary war and ultimately sentenced to death on June 15, 1782, by 
the Virginia General Court.
53
 Caton, Lamb, and Hopkins petitioned the 
Virginia House of Delegates for a pardon. The House voted in favor of 
the pardon, but the Senate voted against it.
54
 
 Virginia‘s Treason Act stated that both houses must agree to 
allow a pardon.
55
 However, Virginia‘s state constitution seemed only to 
require the consent of the House, which the three prisoners had already 
obtained. In October, 1782, the prisoners argued in front of the Virginia 
General Court that the statute violated the state constitution; thus, the 
pardon was effective. Attorney General Edmond Randolph argued the 
opposite, requesting an order of execution. The General Court ultimately 
refused to decide the issue, determining that the issue should be 
presented to Virginia‘s highest court, the Virginia Court of Appeals.56 
Sitting on the Virginia Court of Appeals were Edmund Pendleton, 
George Wythe, John Blair, Paul Carrington, Bartholomew Dandridge, 
Peter Lyons, James Mercer, and Richard Cary.
57
 One of the questions 
presented to the court was whether a court could declare ―an Act of the 
Legislature void because it was repugnant to the Constitution, without 
exercising the Power of Legislation, from which they are restrained by 
the same Constitution?‖58 
Attorney General Edmund Randolph apparently advocated that the 
court did have the power to declare a statute unconstitutional; however, 
his precise position was that the statute and the constitution were 
consistent. Under his interpretation the court could avoid declaring the 
 
 52. William M. Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 
U. PA. L. REV. 491, 494 (1994). Treanor obtained Edmund Randolph‘s and St. George Tucker‘s 
handwritten notes from this time period and scrupulously examined both sets. In his article, he also 
outlines numerous primary sources. All factual assertions in the discussion of the Case of Prisoners 
have been drawn from his article. It is of course extremely relevant to discussions of judicial review 
before Marbury v. Madison since ―as a member of the Federal Constitutional Convention, Randolph 
proposed the Virginia Plan—the principal source for the Federal Constitution—and he subsequently 
was the first United States Attorney General, and, later, Thomas Jefferson‘s successor as Secretary 
of State.‖ Id. at 494. 
 53. Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782). 
 54. 2 EDMUND PENDLETON, THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON, 1734–1803 
417 (David Mays ed. 1967). 
 55. See Traenor, supra note 52, at 502. 
 56. Id. at 502–3. 
 57. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at n.5. 
 58. See PENDLETON, supra note 54, at 417 (emphasis added). 
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statute void and an order for execution would be proper.
59
 The three 
prisoners responded
60
 to Randolph‘s arguments: ―[t]he act of assembly 
was contrary to the plain declaration of the constitution; and therefore 
void.‖61 
After hearing Randolph and the three prisoners‘ arguments, the court 
heard from amicus advocates including well known lawyer and 
revolutionary St. George Tucker.
62
 Tucker also advocated for judicial 
review, although his justification was premised on separation of powers 
principles both in theory (Montesquieu) and in substance (the Virginia 
Constitution).
63
 
On November 2, 1782, the Virginia Court of Appeals handed down 
its decision by way of eight seriatim opinions.
64
 Comparing the records 
of the Reporter, Daniel Call, with Chancellor Pendleton‘s notes, 
conflicting versions of the rationale emerge.
65
 Call‘s records suggest that 
all eight judges accepted Randolph‘s statutory construction argument; 
however, seven of them agreed in dicta that the court could declare a 
statute unconstitutional.
66
 
On the other hand, Pendleton‘s notes may indicate that at least two of 
the judges sided wholeheartedly with the prisoners.
67
 Justice Mercer 
seemed to hold the statute unconstitutional while Justice Dandridge ruled 
for the prisoners in that the statute and constitution provided independent 
ways for obtaining a pardon and the prisoners did receive a valid pardon 
under the constitution. Only Justice Lyons specifically rejected judicial 
review, while the five others held the Treason Act constitutional. Most 
notably, Justice Wythe advocated that if the court were to find, or ―prove 
that an Anti-constitutional Act of the Legislature would be void . . . this 
Court must in Judgment declare it so, or not decide according to the Law 
of the land.‖68 
This case is arguably the best evidence of the origins of judicial 
review in pre-Marbury America, especially due to the prominence of 
 
 59. Treanor, supra note 52, at 507. ―Randolph declared himself in favor of judicial review in 
a fashion that was both dramatic and that conveyed the difficulty that he felt in adopting this 
position.‖ Id. at 512. 
 60. Id. n.107. There is apparently a dispute as to who actually argued on behalf of the 
prisoners. It may have been one Samuel Hardy or Andrew Ronald. See id. 
 61. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 7. 
 62. Traenor, supra note 52, at 520. Tucker would later become both a state and federal court 
judge and a professor at William and Mary as George Wythe‘s successor. Id. 
 63. Id. at 522–25. 
 64. Id. at 529–30. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 530. 
 68. See PENDLETON, supra note 54, at 426–27 (summarizing each judges‘ respective view). 
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such figures involved as Madison, Tucker, Randolph, Pendleton, and 
Wythe.
69
 The presence of judicial review in this case is practically 
undeniable. Whether notions of fundamental or natural law were present 
is a closer question. It is likely that both natural law and fundamental law 
were involved in the judges‘ review of the Treason Act‘s alleged 
repugnancy: natural law in the judges‘ reasoning, and fundamental law 
codified in the Virginia Constitution. 
Vanhorne’s Lessee is another prime example of judicial review 
taking root in the new republic. Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorance involved 
a property dispute between the defendant John Dorance and the plaintiff 
Thomas Van Horne.
70
 The uncontested facts of the case were as follows: 
William and Thomas Penn presented to the court ―a Deed from the Six 
[Native American] Nations‖ along with a map of the land and proper 
survey.
71
 Subsequently William and Thomas Penn granted to Thomas 
Vanhorne a lease, for a term of seven years, of lot No. 38 containing one 
hundred acres.
72
 Another lease was executed from the Penns to Thomas 
Vanhorne for lot No. 20.
73
 Thomas Vanhorne then leased lot No. 20 to 
Cornelius Vanhorne.
74
 It was then found in evidence that one John 
Dorance was in possession of lot No. 20, and he claimed that the deed he 
received from Native Americans was valid under Pennsylvania‘s 
Quieting and Confirming Act.
75
 
Justice William Patterson addressed the question presented whether 
the confirming act was constitutional ―or, in other words, whether the 
Legislature had authority to make that act.‖76 Justice Patterson analyzed 
the case comparing the power of a court to review legislative acts in 
England and in the new republic. Patterson acknowledged that the 
primary difference between English and American review was that 
England‘s constitution was unwritten. The general position in England 
was that Parliament could not be questioned by the judicial department, 
but ―[w]hatever may be the case in other countries, yet in this there can 
be no doubt, that every act of the legislature, repugnant to the 
constitution, is absolutely void.‖77 
 
 69. Treanor, supra note 52, at 496. Madison, though not participating in the trial, was 
―intimately familiar with the case.‖ Id. at 496. 
 70. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 304 (1795). 
 71. Id. at 304–05. 
 72. Id. at 305. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 305–07. 
 76. Id. at 307. 
 77. Id. at 308 (emphasis added). 
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Patterson ultimately found the Confirming Act unconstitutional and 
judicial review began to take root. Both Vanhorne’s Lessee and the Case 
of Prisoners demonstrate pre-Marbury judicial review. In addition, both 
cases used the corporate-derived ―repugnancy review‖ to review 
legislative actions for constitutionality. 
 
B.  Colonial Corporate Practice 
 
Around the time of Dr. Bonham’s Case, early colonials were arriving 
and settling in America. The authority to govern certain geographic areas 
was granted to the colonists by the Crown by way of letters patent.
78
 
These early grants formed domestic corporations in colonial America.
79
 
Letters patent contained a requirement that corporate by-laws not be 
repugnant or contrary to English law.
80
 For example, Virginia‘s 1611 
charter imposed that laws ―be not contrary.‖81 Likewise, the 1620 New 
England charter, the 1629 Massachusetts Bay charter, the 1662 
Connecticut charter, and the 1663 Rhode Island charter all contained 
similar language requiring that corporate by-laws not be repugnant to the 
law of England.
82
 
Subsequently, the Privy Council ―reviewed over 8500 colonial acts 
from colonial legislatures and around 250 appeals from colonial courts 
that had themselves struggled over the relationship between colonial law 
and the laws of England.‖83 If nothing else, the sheer quantity of reviews 
establishes the reasonable and defensible inference that the practice of 
reviewing English corporate laws for repugnancy to the laws of England 
made its way to the colonies and was a pervasive practice.
84
 
 
 
 
 
 
 78. MARY S. BILDER, ENGLISH SETTLEMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE, IN THE CAMBRIDGE 
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 65 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Michael Grossberg eds., 2007). 
 79. Bilder, supra note 1, at 535 (―Initial settlements in Virginia and Massachusetts Bay, 
among others, were structured as corporations. The use of the corporate form is not surprising given 
the overlap between members of London companies and colonial ventures.‖). 
 80. Id. at 536. 
 81. Id. (citing The Third Charter of Virginia (1611–1612), reprinted in 7 FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3802, 3806 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909)). 
 82. Id. at 536–37 & nn. 179–83. 
 83. Id. at 538. 
 84. Id. at 538–41. See also 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 159 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (stating that colonial ―assemblies had the 
power of making local laws and ordinances, not repugnant to the laws of England, but as near as 
may be agreeable thereto, subject to the ratification and disapproval of the crown.‖). 
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C.  The Early Debates of Judicial Review 
 
Now that the link between early English practice and early colonial 
practice has been established, a review of early colonial debates may 
shed light on whether these practices influenced early colonial thought. 
Discussions of judicial review most commonly occurred during the 
1787 Constitutional Convention when debates centered on the Council of 
Revision.
85
 During the debates, Massachusetts‘s Rufus King held the 
position that federal judges should not have power to declare laws 
invalid in the Council of Revision because they already had the power to 
―stop the operation of such as shall appear repugnant to the 
constitution.‖86 
Pennsylvania‘s James Wilson disagreed with Rufus King, 
contending that a judge did have the power to hold a law 
unconstitutional, but that this power ―did not go far enough.‖87 James 
Madison himself stated that ―a law violating a constitution established by 
the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & 
void.‖88 
Seven years after the ratification of the Constitution in 1791, 
Supreme Court Justice Chase, in referring to reviews of legislative acts 
for consistency with natural law, stated: 
 
There are certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, 
which will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of 
legislative power . . . . An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a 
law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot 
be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.
89
 
 
Justice Chase‘s embrace of natural law90 principles despite the existence 
of a written constitution demonstrates the pervasiveness of the concept 
that constitutions, whether written or unwritten, and legislatures, whether 
 
 85. Shawn Gunnarson, Comment, Using History to Reshape the Discussion of Judicial 
Review, 1994 BYU L. REV. 151, 162 (1994) (emphasis added). The Council of Revision was a 
political entity considered and ultimately rejected at the Constitutional Convention. Its purpose was 
to review acts passed by Congress and either veto or approve them. Id. at 151. 
 86. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 109 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 
1966). 
 87. See Gunnarson, supra note 85, at 164, n.80. 
 88. Id. at 168, n.111. 
 89. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis added). 
 90. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED 
YEARS 46–47 (1994) (concluding that Justice Chase endorsed natural law review). But see JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 210–11 (1980). 
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omnipotent (e.g., Parliament) or coordinate, are constrained by natural 
law. 
 
V.  A REPUGNANT REVIEW, REVISITED—NATURAL LAW CONTROLS 
 
Cases such as Bonham’s Case, Clark’s Case, and Chamberlain of 
London’s Case establish that early English courts likely reviewed Acts of 
Parliament through their grants of corporate powers for repugnancy with 
fundamental principles of natural law.
91
 Coke‘s words ―against common 
right and reason‖ carry with them notions of both natural and 
fundamental law.
92
 Coke concluded that a legislative act allowing a 
corporation to be both judge and jury was repugnant to natural law, or in 
other words, ―common right and reason.‖93 ―‗The law of nature . . . is 
also called the law of reason‘ and . . . English lawyers were accustomed 
to say that if anything ‗be prohibited by the law nature . . . it is against 
reason.‘‖94 It is reasonable to assume that a seventeenth-century lawyer 
may presume that the phrase against reason was interchangeable with 
―against the law of nature.‖95 
The frequency with which corporate judicial reviews for repugnancy 
employed an ―against reason‖ analysis indicates that natural law was an 
inherent part of corporate review. This suggestion is strengthened by the 
fact that the laws being reviewed had been authorized by Parliament, 
which was empowered to make any kind of law it wanted. While the 
practice of reviewing legislative or royal acts for repugnancy occurred in 
the corporate context, concepts of natural law invalidated these laws.
96
 
 
 91. This case‘s argument is contrary to that of those who argue that Bonham’s Case was 
mere statutory construction and to those who hold the position that because England has an 
unwritten constitution, English cases are irrelevant to the discussion of judicial review. 
 92. Berger, supra note 21. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 529 (citing ST. GERMAIN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, ch. 2 at 5, ch. 5 at 12 (W. 
Muchall ed., 1886)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. The best way to understand judicial review is that the early American cases, debates, and 
statements were influenced by a longstanding practice of English courts reviewing corporate charters 
for repugnancy. This is Bilder‘s view. While ideas and theories frequently present themselves in the 
historical context, practices and traditions of certain institutions inherently have more resilience. 
Coke‘s court commonly reviewed corporate charters provided by Parliament for repugnancy. 
Whether this was statutory construction or constitutional review is relevant as a condition precedent 
to corporate practice influence. If only statutory construction, Bonham’s Case would likely be less 
influential to American courts dealing with statutes. But if Chief Justice Coke did in fact have 
fundamental principles of natural law in mind when he stated that an act of Parliament may be held 
void if repugnant to ―common right and reason,‖ then this provides a sturdy basis for early American 
influence in two senses. First, it is a pure instance of a court addressing a superior portion of 
government. Second, it establishes that even the omnipotent Parliament is controlled by some higher 
principle—natural law. 
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Therefore, the word repugnant is properly associated with both natural 
law and corporate practice. 
But what seems undeniable is that Coke held the steadfast position 
that ―common right and reason‖ was the determination of 
constitutionality and that only judges had the skill and wisdom to make 
these decisions.
97
 ―No human law which was contrary to these universal 
laws [of ‗nature or reason‘] was valid.‖98 This is not to say that 
parliamentary supremacy
99
 was not in full tilt. Coke did not espouse the 
position that he as Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas was the 
final word.
100
 Rather, his view holding judges in the highest regard can 
be reconciled with notions of parliamentary supremacy since, ―himself 
half medievalist, [Coke] still regarded Parliament as a court: the High 
Court of Parliament, last appeal above King‘s Bench.‖101 It was the 
routine practice of reviewing corporate charters for consistency (the 
opposite of repugnancy) with notions of natural law that influenced 
Coke‘s placement of the ―wisdom of the judges . . . above the wisdom of 
the legislature, and sealed his faith with the witness of his career.‖102 
According to Boyer, ―Coke formulated the principle of judicial review, 
and his defense of this proposition provided the paradigm of the 
independent judge.‖103 
The link to American judicial review, even disregarding corporate 
practices or the use of the word repugnant, is the fact that early state 
constitutions and ultimately our Federal Constitution codified many 
natural law principles and ―[s]uddenly the fundamental law and the first 
principles
104
 that Englishmen had referred to for generations had a degree 
of explicitness and reality that they never before quite had.‖105 
 
 97. JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY—COKE, HOBBES, AND THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (U. Kan. Press, 1992) (citing SIR EDWARD COKE, 
FIRST INSTITUTES 97b (―For reason is the life of the Law, nay the Common Law it selfe is nothing 
else but reason, which is to be understood of an artifciall perfection of reason gotten by long studie, 
obseruation and experience and not every mans naturall reason, for nemo nascitur artifex [no one is 
born skillful] [sic].‖)). 
 98. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 46, at 280. 
 99. For a full review of parliamentary supremacy, see George Winterton, The British 
Grundnorm: Parliamentary Supremacy Re-examined, 92 LAW Q. REV. 591 (1976). 
 100. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR 
EDWARD COKE (Atlantic-Little 1957). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Allen Dillard Boyer, ―Understanding, Authority, and Will‖: Sir Edward Coke and the 
Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review, 39 B.C. L. REV. 43, 45 (1997). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). 
 105. Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court 
Made More Out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 787, 795 (1999) (citing Letter from James Iredell 
to Richard Spraight (Aug. 26, 1787), in 2 GRIFFITH J. MCREE, LIFE AND CORREPONDENCE OF JAMES 
IREDELL 172, 174 (1857)). 
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Parliament‘s granting of charters in England paralleled those colonial 
charters bestowed upon American colonies, as Gordon Wood has 
written, the state constitutions ―were still identified in the minds of many 
with their old colonial charters, as contracts between magistrates and 
people, defining and delimiting the power and rights of each.‖106 By 
codifying notions of natural and fundamental law (that is, reducing to 
writing the principles used by English courts to review Acts of 
Parliament for repugnancy), concreteness and explicitness now defined 
the government‘s relationship with the people.107 
What is even more important is not what Coke meant but how his 
famous statement was understood in colonial America. As has been 
nicely put, ―a seventeenth-century lawyer and a later Colonial might well 
have understood—as, in fact, they did—Coke to mean simpliciter that no 
Act of Parliament could contravene ‗fundamental‘ law.‖108 And from a 
more general historical perspective, ―[a]lmost all eighteenth-century 
Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic had recognized something 
called fundamental law as a guide to the moral rightness and 
constitutionality or ordinary law and politics.‖109 Blackstone himself, 
despite his strict adherence to Parliamentary Sovereignty, believed that 
natural law could control an Act of Parliament.
110
 
Perhaps the best colonial example of natural or fundamental law at 
issue is James Otis‘s argument in the Writs of Assistance Case (1761) 
that the issuance of general warrants was illegal and therefore ought to be 
outlawed
111
. Delivering one of the most famous arguments in legal 
history,
112
 Otis cited Coke‘s famous statement in Bonham’s Case arguing 
 
 106. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, 271 
(1969). 
 107. Harrington, supra note 7, at 69 (―The act of reducing fundamental law to writing had the 
effect of making explicit what in England was only an imaginary or hypothetical relationship 
between the people and their government.‖). 
 108. Berger, supra note 21, at 528. 
 109. Wood, supra note 105, at 794. 
 110. Id. (citing J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, 
206–14 (1985)). 
 111. James Otis, Speech on the Writs of Assistance (1761), in 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 7, n.35 (2d ed. 1991). 
 112. Id. 
 
I will to my dying day oppose with all the powers and faculties God has given me all 
such instruments of slavery, on the one hand, and villainy, on the other, as this writ of 
assistance is. 
It appears to me the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of 
English liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that was ever found in English 
lawbook. 
. . . . 
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that general warrants were ―against common right and reason.‖113 
Therefore, Otis‘s statement is great evidence that colonials understood 
both Coke‘s statement to involve notions of natural law and judicial 
review. Otis was attempting to persuade the judiciary to review the act of 
the executive in executing general warrants, though his argument proved 
unsuccessful. 
Otis‘s statements seem to draw on both notions of natural and 
fundamental law—that is, both God-given rights and inherent reason to 
prohibit general warrants. Again, this is 1761, twenty-six years before 
the Constitutional Convention. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Examining the origins of judicial review, to some, may seem a futile 
exercise. Regardless of whether we ever come to an accurate 
understanding of its origins, judicial review is unquestionably here to 
stay (whether it was intended or not). But the benefit of these historically 
driven analyses is that the present will soon be gone and historical 
accounts may inform our future constitutional doctrines. It was true then, 
and it is true today, that ―a page of history is worth a volume of logic.‖114 
If the Supreme Court were to find fifty years from now that the 
current form of judicial review is too expansive and inconsistent with the 
Founders‘ intent, how far would the Court roll back judicial review? 
Originalist inquiries are important to anticipate these issues and are 
equally important in other areas of constitutional law. For example, one 
hotly debated constitutional principle is the exclusionary rule. The 
Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule in federal courts in 
1914.
115
This rule was extended to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, almost five 
decades later.
116
 Portions of the current debate center on whether the 
 
  . . . [T]he writ prayed for in this petition, being general, is illegal. It is a power that 
places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer. 
  . . . . 
  . . . A man‘s house is his castle; and whilst he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a 
prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate this 
privilege. Customhouse officers may enter our houses when they please; we are 
commanded to permit their entry. . . . Bare suspicion without oath is sufficient. 
  . . . . 
  . . . Every man prompted by revenge, ill humor, or wantonness to inspect the inside 
of his neighbor‘s house may get a writ of assistance. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 113. Id. 
 114. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
 115. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 116. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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exclusionary rule is constitutionally required, or whether it may be 
replaced with a more effective remedy. 
Exemplifying the role of Originalist debate, Timothy Lynch argues 
that separations of powers principles justify the exclusionary rule and 
that it is constitutionally required.
117
 On the other hand, Akhil Amar 
argues that the exclusionary rule may be replaced with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
which he argues suits as an available remedy to defendants that have had 
their civil rights violated.
118
 Many others have proposed alternative 
means for replacing the exclusionary rule and, thus, implicitly advocate 
that the Constitution does not require the rule‘s existence. But if the 
Supreme Court were ever to test the exclusionary rule‘s existence, 
historical accounts of the Founders‘ and colonials‘ practices and thoughts 
would surely be relevant to question. 
Applying these originalist inquiries to the judicial review debate, 
suppose Professors‘ Prakash and Yoo are correct that both the text and 
structure (separation of powers) principles clearly authorized judicial 
review.
119
 If so, this would certainly bolster Timothy Lynch‘s argument 
that the exclusionary rule, though not mentioned in the Fourth 
Amendment, is required and justified by separation of power principles. 
By extension, the judiciary must exclude evidence to perform a ―check‖ 
on the executive.
120
 The history of the origins of the exclusionary rule, 
like the origins of judicial review, may become of utmost importance in 
future discussions pertaining to its legitimacy. 
In addition, recall at the end of Part IV of this article the example of 
James Otis citing Coke‘s famous statement in Bonham’s Case during the 
Writs of Assistance Case.
121
 Otis‘ ultimate goal, presumably, was to 
exclude the evidence obtained by the execution of a general warrant and, 
in turn, his client would go free. Any in-depth analysis of the Writs of 
Assistance Case relates to both judicial review and the exclusionary rule. 
Also recall that case occurred in 1761, twenty-six years before the 
Constitutional Convention. A further understanding of the origins of 
judicial review fills in historical gaps in many areas of constitutional law 
and theory, evidenced by the cross-section of the exclusionary rule and 
judicial review some two hundred and forty-seven years ago. Examining 
the history and origins of judicial review may unearth facts, inferences, 
 
 117. Timothy Lynch, In Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 711 
(2000). 
 118. Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 813 (1994). 
 119. Prakash & Yoo, supra note 17, at 894-927. 
 120. Lynch, supra note 117, at 715. 
 121. Otis, supra note 111. 
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or other accounts that are relevant not only to judicial review, but to 
other constitutional doctrines as well. 
A historical analysis of early English, colonial, and American 
practices and thoughts demonstrates that judicial review stemmed from 
corporate practices being reviewed for consistency with principles of 
fundamental and natural law. When our constitutions—state and 
federal—were reduced to writing, codifying certain fundamental and 
natural law notions, judicial review took root in a more concrete form, 
because courts were dealing with a concrete document. 
If ―a page of history is worth a volume of logic,‖ hopefully this 
alternative historical view will alter the way some of the pages of history 
are viewed and, thus, revise a section in the volume of logic. 
